引用本文:王欢明,陈洋愉,李鹏.基于演化博弈理论的雾霾治理中政府环境规制策略研究[J].环境科学研究,2017,30(4):621-627.
WANG Huanming,CHEN Yangyu,LI Peng.Government Strategy for Smog Regulation: Evidence from Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Reserrch of Environmental Science,2017,30(4):621-627.]
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基于演化博弈理论的雾霾治理中政府环境规制策略研究
王欢明, 陈洋愉, 李 鹏
大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院, 辽宁 大连 116024
摘要:
高效、经济治理雾霾(重污染天气)已成为全社会共同行动目标.为验证中央政府制定的系统性激励政策能否有效规避传统环境规制失灵,选取中央政府及地方政府作为博弈模型参与方,将激励机制引入约束条件,建立了中央与地方政府、地方政府与企业的演化博弈模型,从最佳规制效果和规制强度两个维度构建了双方最佳规制策略.研究发现,各地政府在治理雾霾中,引入中央政府规制约束,分配治理成本和提供资金支持,是避免规制失灵的关键.此外,中央与地方应采取差异的规制策略:在中央政府层面,中央政府治理雾霾专项资金分配最优策略应是使资金量(F)与地方政府申报量()呈正相关,并且呈边际递减关系;地方政府对于企业的超排行为不应采取严罚的手段,随着企业超排量的加大,更好的规制手段不是加大惩罚力度,而是从更加合理的环境税费(t)以及降低企业边际减排成本〔TCp3′(p3)〕上着手.
关键词:  环境规制  演化博弈  环境治理  雾霾
DOI:
分类号:
基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年项目(71303028);辽宁省社科基金一般项目(L16BGL013)
Government Strategy for Smog Regulation: Evidence from Evolutionary Game Theory
WANG Huanming, CHEN Yangyu, LI Peng
School of Public Administration and Law, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
Abstract:
Abstract:Governing smog efficiently and economically has become a common goal for the whole society.The central and local governments have established a series of regulatory tools to avoid the failure of traditional environmental policies.To test the efficiency of these regulatory tools,central and local governments were selected to be actors to construct an evolutionary game model.Then,the optimal regulation strategies were deduced from the optimal regulation effectiveness and the optimal regulation intensity.The results showed that it is necessary to bring in the central government′s regulations on governing smog,which includes allocating costs and supplying public funds.The central and local governments have different regulation strategies.At the central government level,the best way to use the special fund for smog governance is to ensure a diminishing marginal subsidy relationship between the amount of funds subsidy(F)and the local government′s demand().At the local government level,local governments should not adopt policies to severely punish the enterprises which have excess emissions.The alternative regulatory tool is to increase the environment tax(t)and decrease the marginal emission cost TCp3′(p3).
Key words:  environmental regulation  evolutionary game  environmental governance  smog